Homeland Security: Coast Guard Operations - Background and Issues for Congress by O'Rourke, Ronald
1  The Coast Guard is to operate as a service within the Navy upon declaration of war or when
the President directs, until the President by executive order transfers it back to its peacetime
parent department (14 USC 3).
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Order Code RS21125
Updated February 14, 2003
Homeland Security: Coast Guard Operations
– Background and Issues for Congress
Ronald O’Rourke
Specialist in National Defense
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
The Coast Guard is the lead federal agency for maritime homeland security, which
includes port security.  The Coast Guard’s FY2004 budget request includes $206 million
for new maritime homeland security initiatives.  The Coast Guard’s role in homeland
security was changed by the law establishing the new Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) (H.R. 5005/P.L. 107-296), which transfers the Coast Guard from the Department
of Transportation (DoT) to DHS and protects the Coast Guard’s missions, including its
non-homeland security missions, and by the Maritime Transportation Security Act of
2002 (S. 1214/P.L. 107-295).  This report will be updated as events warrant.
Background
The Coast Guard’s Role in Homeland Security.  The Coast Guard, the
federal government’s principal maritime law-enforcement agency, is a military service
and a branch of the armed forces. On March 1, 2003, it will be transferred from the
Department of Transportation (DoT) top the new Department of Homeland Security
(DHS).1 The Coast Guard is the lead federal agency for Maritime Homeland Security
(DHS).  The Coast Guard states that, as such,
the Coast Guard’s mission, in conjunction with joint and interagency forces, is to
protect the U.S. Maritime Domain and the U.S. Marine Transportation System and
deny their use and exploitation by terrorists as a means for attacks on U.S. territory,
population and critical infrastructure.  The Coast Guard will prepare for, and in the
event of an attack, conduct emergency response operations.  When directed, the Coast
Guard, as the supported or supporting commander, will conduct military homeland
defense operations in its traditional role as a military service....
The Coast Guard has developed a MHLS Strategy that implements the maritime
component of the President’s [homeland security] plan.  It addresses both event-driven
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and prevention-based operations through the following strategic objectives: (1)
Prevent terrorist attacks within and terrorist exploitation of the U.S. Maritime
Domain.  (2) Reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism within the U.S. Maritime
Domain.  (3) Protect U.S. population centers, critical infrastructure, maritime borders,
ports, coastal approaches and boundaries and “seams” among them.  (4) Protect the
U.S. Marine Transportation System while preserving the freedom of maritime domain
for legitimate pursuits.  (5) Minimize the damage and recover from attacks that may
occur within the U.S. Maritime Domain as either the Lead Federal Agency or a
supporting agency.2
Homeland-Security Operations Immediately After September 11, 2001.
In response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Coast Guard took actions
to create the largest port-security operation since World War II.  Coast Guard cutters and
aircraft were diverted from more distant operating areas to patrol U.S. ports and coastal
waters.  The Coast Guard established and enforced security zones to protect Navy ships
and bases.  Coast Guard personnel began boarding and inspecting inbound vessels,
escorting cruise ships into and out of port, and escorting oil tankers into and out of
Valdez, Alaska.  The Coast Guard instituted new regulations requiring inbound ships to
provide 96-hour (as opposed to the previous 24-hour) advance notice of arrival, to provide
more time to board and inspect vessels.  Four of the Coast Guard’s 6 Port Security Units
(PSUs)3 were activated and assigned to help protect ports.  And Coast Guard sea marshals
began boarding and riding inbound commercial ships.
The expansion of Coast Guard homeland-security operations led to a major
reshuffling of the service’s mission priorities.  Port-security operations, which had
accounted for about 1%-2% of all Coast Guard operations prior to September 11, 2001
increased to 56% of all operations by October 9, 2001.  To accommodate this expansion,
significant reductions were made to operations in other missions.  As part of its effort to
move toward what Coast Guard officials call the “new normalcy” in Coast Guard
operations  (i.e., the service’s new, post-September 11, 2001 status quo), the Coast Guard
is reducing is port-security operations toward a goal of 20%-25% of all operations.
Homeland Security Operations During FY2002.  During FY2002, Coast
Guard homeland security activities included the following:
! Assigning escorts to protect vessels and critical infrastructure.
! Improving Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) – the Coast Guard’s
knowledge of all activities and elements in the maritime domain – by
establishing a National Movement Vessel Center and by continuing to
enforce the requirement for 96-hour advance notice of arrival.
! Operating cutters, boats, aircraft, and Marine Safety staffs in harbors and
coastal regions at heightened operational tempos.
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! Delivering additional small boats and crews to strategic ports.
! Activating almost one-third of the Coast Guard’s 8,000 reservists.
! Completing, for various ports, port security assessments that are aimed
at reducing the vulnerability of strategic maritime infrastructure and in-
port Navy ships.
! Activating 4 Marine Safety and Security Teams (MSSTs) that can be
deployed to various ports to enhance port security as needed.
! Tracking and screening all high-interest vessels (HIVs) – ships that meet
certain criteria that qualify them as worthy of close monitoring when in
or near U.S. waters.
! Coordinating security operations with other federal and local agencies,
and forging information-sharing arrangements with both them and local
port stakeholders.  This included participating in port security
committees, multi-agency security exercises, and safety and security task
forces, and working with the Customs Service in connection with that
agency’s Container Security Initiative (CSI).
! Drafting and proposing new International Maritime Organization (IMO)
security measures.4
FY2004 Homeland Security Initiatives.  The Coast Guard states that its
proposed FY2004 budget contains $206 million for new initiatives aimed at further
enhancing maritime homeland security. Of this total, is $34 million is for improved
Maritime Domain Awareness, specifically (1) improved communication links for cutters
and smaller assets; (2) a Universal Automated Identification System (UAIS) for large
cutters that is consistent with IMO and domestic carriage requirements; and (3) a
prototype Joint Harbor Operations Center (JHOC) staffed with Department of Defense
personnel to provide surveillance and command and control capabilities for protecting
critical infrastructure.  The remaining $172 million is to be used for:
! creating 6 additional Maritime Safety and Security Teams;
! creating 2 additional Port Security Units (PSUs) for domestic and
overseas port-security operations;
! establishing new Coast Guard stations in Boston and Washington;
! adding 53 sea marshals for riding aboard commercial vessels;
! acquiring 9 coastal patrol boats;
! acquiring 8 medium port security response boats; and
! acquiring 43 small port security response boats.
Resources vs. Missions Prior to September 11, 2001.  Even before
September 11, 2001, the Coast Guard appeared hard-pressed to perform all its missions
at desired levels with available assets and resources.  Many of the service’s cutters are old,
expensive to operate and maintain, and not well suited for some of the missions they
undertake.  Some Coast Guard units have very high operational tempos.  The service has
experienced difficulties in recent years in retaining sufficient numbers of experienced
personnel and maintaining some of its aircraft at desired levels of readiness.  Prior to
September 11, 2001 insufficient funding to operate Coast Guard assets to their full
potential was a recurrent issue, and some observers expressed concerns or doubts about
the Coast Guard’s ability to finance key equipment modernization programs, such as its
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Deepwater acquisition project for replacing aging cutters and aircraft.5  Prior to September
11, 2001, Coast Guard leaders and supporters attempted repeatedly to draw attention to
this missions-vs.-resources situation.  They noted that the Coast Guard today is smaller
than it was several years ago, even though its responsibilities have expanded considerably
over the last 25 years as a result of substantial growth in mission areas such as counter-
drug operations, alien interception, pollution prevention, and fisheries enforcement.
Port Security.  Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, policymakers
have expressed strong concern for the security of the nation’s seaports, for which only
modest security procedures were in place prior to September 11, 2001.  Although the
Coast Guard is a key player in maintaining port security, other federal and local agencies
have important roles to play in port security.  Thus, while Coast Guard homeland-security
operations focus to a large degree on port security, the issue of port security encompasses
more than the Coast Guard.6
Coast Guard Location Within Executive Branch.  Debate about the Coast
Guard in 2002 centered to a large degree on whether the Coast Guard should be
transferred to DHS, and if so, in what exact way.  The Administration’s proposal to create
a new DHS, announced on June 6, 2002, included a proposal to transfer the Coast Guard
from DoT to DHS.  The Administration’s proposal mirrored some other bills introduced
in Congress prior to June 6, 2002, that would transfer the Coast Guard into a new
department for homeland security.  The issue of where in the executive branch the Coast
Guard should be located existed prior to September 11, 2001.7  Following the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001, but prior to the Administration’s June 6, 2002
announcement, Coast Guard officials argued that the Coast Guard’s increased focus on
conducting expanded homeland security operations argued against the idea of transferring
the Coast Guard to another parent department because such a transfer could disrupt Coast
Guard homeland security operations at a critical time.
Following the Administration’s announcement of its homeland security
reorganization plan, Coast Guard officials supported the proposal to transfer the Coast
Guard to DHS, stating that the Coast Guard is a logical component of the proposed
Department.  Some Members of Congress expressed concern that transferring the Coast
Guard to DHS could lead to a reduced focus on important Coast Guard missions not
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directly related to homeland security, such as search and rescue, fisheries law
enforcement, and marine environmental protection.  The Coast Guard argued that it has
always operated within parent departments whose core mission did not align directly with
some of the Coast Guard’s various missions, and that the Coast Guard would continue to
pay full attention to all its missions, including its non-homeland security missions,
following its transfer to  DHS.
Legal Authorities.  Coast Guard officials state that their legal authorities are quite
broad and are generally sufficient for conducting post-September 11, 2001 homeland-
security responsibilities.  One change that the Coast Guard sought in 2002 was an
expansion of its authority to enforce rules and regulations for controlling vessels in U.S.
territorial waters so that the authority extends to U.S. waters up to 12 miles from shore
(the current definition of U.S. territorial waters, adopted in 1988), rather than its current
statutory authority, which extends out only to 3 miles from shore (the pre-1988 definition
of U.S. territorial waters).  This was accomplished by Section 104 of S. 1214/P.L. 107-
295 (see discussion below under Legislative Activity.)
Issues for Congress
Missions vs. Resources.  A key potential issue for the 108th Congress concerns
the adequacy of Coast Guard resources for carrying out the Coast Guard’s homeland
security and non-homeland security missions.  The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001
increased Coast Guard requirements for the homeland-security mission without obviously
reducing requirements for other, pre-September11, 2001 missions.  Some observers go
further, arguing that September 11, 2001, if anything, strengthened requirements for Coast
Guard counter-drug and alien migrant interception operations, since terrorists can use
drug profits to finance their activities and might try to enter the United States illegally by
ship.  Few observers appear to oppose the general notion that the Coast Guard’s resources
will need to be increased to bring them into better alignment with the service’s post-
September 11, 2001 mission requirements.  The issue appears to center more on the
question of the size of the increase that will be needed.  Some observers are concerned
that if the Coast Guard’s resources are not increased sufficiently, it could compel the
Coast Guard to reduce operations for homeland security missions, or non-homeland
security missions, or both, below desired levels.
Coordination With Other Agencies.  Another potential issue for Congress
concerns coordination between the Coast Guard and other government agencies.  DHS
was created in part to improve coordination between the Coast Guad and other agencies
involved in homeland security.  One potential question for Congress is how effective DHS
will be in achieving coordination between the Coast Guard and other civilian agencies
involved in homeland security.  Another concerns coordination between the Coast Guard
and the Navy, which also has a role in maritime homeland security.8
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Legislative Activity in 2002
H.R. 5005/P.L. 107-296.  H.R. 5005, the bill establishing DHS, was passed by the
Senate on November 19, 2002 and by the House on November 22, 2002, and was signed
into law as P.L. 107-296 on November 25, 2002.  Section 888 transfers to DHS “the
authorities, functions, personnel, and assets of the Coast Guard, which shall be maintained
as a distinct entity” within DHS; preserves the Coast Guard’s missions, including its non-
homeland security missions, along with the assets needed to perform those missions;
stipulates that the Commandant of the Coast Guard will report directly to the Secretary
of DHS; and directs DHS to submit a report on the feasibility and potential implications
accelerating procurement of the Coast Guard’s new Deepwater assets from 20 years to 10
years.  Section 307(c)(3) reserves 10 percent of certain research and development funding
to be spent by the DHS through FY2005 for developing maritime security capabilities
intended to minimize the possibility that Coast Guard assets would be diverted from non-
homeland security missions to maritime security missions.
S. 1214/P.L. 107-295.  The conference report (H.Rept. 107-777 of November 13,
2002) on the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (S. 1214) was passed by the
Senate and the House on November 14, 2002, and was signed into law as P.L. 107-295
on November 25, 2002.  The law contains several provisions relating to the Coast Guard’s
role in maritime homeland security.  Sec. 102 directs the establishment of procedures for
coordinating the activities of Coast Guard maritime safety and security teams as part of
a National Maritime Transportation Plan for deterring and responding to a transportation
security incident; requires the designation of a Coast Guard officials as local-area Federal
Maritime Security Coordinators, who shall develop and submit Area Maritime
Transportation Security Plans; directs the Secretary of DHS to establish Coast Guard
maritime safety and security teams; and makes costs for additional Coast Guard personnel
eligible for coverage under a DHS grant program for financing maritime security
enhancements.
Section 104 of the law extends the territorial waters of the United States (and
corresponding Coast Guard legal authorities) to the 12-mile limit established by
presidential proclamation in 1988.  Section 105 permits the president to suspend Coast
Guard end-strength limitations in time of war or national emergency.  Section 107
provides for the assignment of Coast Guard personnel to act as sea marshals.  Section 110
requires the Coast Guard, in conjunction with the Navy, to submit a report in early 2004
on the life-cycle costs and benefits of creating a Center for Coastal and Maritime Security.
Section 113 provides for the Coast Guard to be consulted during the preparation of a
revised port security planning guide.  Section 341 authorizes DHS to accept from the
Department of Defense up to 7 Cyclone (PC-1) class 170-foot patrol boats for use by the
Coast Guard primarily for expanded drug-interdiction duties.  Section 348 requires DHS
to submit a report on Coast Guard expenditures by mission area before and after
September 11, 2001, and annual funding amounts and personnel levels required to fulfill
pre- and post-September 11, 2001 Coast Guard responsibilities.  Section 348 also requires
the Commandant of the Coast Guard to submit a report on targets for each Coast Guard
mission for FY2003, FY2004, and FY2005, and the specific steps needed to achieve those
targets.  Section 426 requires the Secretary of DHS to submit an annual report, prepared
in conjunction with the Commandant of the Coast Guard, on the capabilities and readiness
of the Coast Guard to fulfill its national defense responsibilities.  Section 502 authorizes
FY2003 appropriations for the Coast Guard.  Section 503 authorizes an increase in the
Coast Guard’s active-duty end strength to 45,500 for FY2003.
